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Joint Intelligence Is JIC/JAC/NMJIC Intelligence

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE IS JIC/JAC/NMJIC INTELLIGENCE

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Ralph Norman Channell

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Most of the material contained in this report is from personal interviews with the Commanders and their staffs in the new Joint Intelligence Centers (JIC's). The graphics appended to the JIC descriptions are courtesy of each organization's POC officers who most ably assisted me in compiling material. U.S. warfare has become joint warfare. The intelligence officers of the new JIC's have embraced this concept, and are participating daily in the new structure. Military intelligence has made great strides in adapting to the new order of warfare. This author is grateful to those who have taken the time to assist in making this summary possible. It is being used to acquaint students at the Naval Postgraduate School with the new JIC structure. The compilation, comments and conclusions are, of course, the responsibility of the author.

The author is particularly grateful to Rear Admiral Cramer, the DNI, who sponsored this research on the JIC structure when he was the J2 for the Joint Chiefs, and to his then assistants in J2, Captains Lautenschlager, Porterfield, and Herrington. Also to Rear Admiral Tom Wilson when he was J2 at the Atlantic Command and Rear Admiral Lowell Jacoby, J2 at the Pacific Command, and to Captain John Liles when he was Commander Atlantic Intelligence Command, Captain Rich Smith, Commander Strategic Command JIC, Captain Vince Fragomene when he was Deputy J2 at European Command, Captain Dave Peszko and Colonel Bob Kielhofer at Central Command, and to Captains Frank Kelly and Bob Simeral when they were the Third Fleet Intelligence Officers. Again, this author is most grateful to all the officers who assisted me in compiling this material.

JOINT INTELLIGENCE IS JIC/JAC/NMJIC INTELLIGENCE

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JOINT INTELLIGENCE IS JIC/JAC/NMJIC INTELLIGENCE

Ralph Norman Channell

I. INTRODUCTION

Intelligence support to the operating forces has been restructured to provide intelligence required along the joint command organization. Although there have been joint intelligence organizations previously, most intelligence support was provided along service lines. The new structure is a major departure from the previous organization. The new structure is primarily a reflection of the new joint command structure with its emphasis on the CJCS, the Joint Staff, the CINC's, and the Joint Task Force. The new intelligence structure was strongly insisted upon by the DoD and key congressional committees. Major cuts in the intelligence community (funding and personnel) were also important factors in the restructuring. The services were generally opposed to the new concept, although Naval Intelligence was quick to recognize the advantages of early participation.

Another key factor enabling the establishment of centralized JIC's was the advent of decentralized computer based systems and improved data communications connectivity, permitting centralized data storage and rapid dissemination. The appearance of the Joint Defense Intelligence Support System (JDISS) and the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS) are prime examples of the availability of the new systems and connectivity.

Another major development is the production of the new joint intelligence publications, and the intelligence Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP's). These publications are establishing common doctrine and terms for the military intelligence community. However, some confusion still exists regarding intelligence terminology. For example, the Navy still uses the term OPINTEL to mean what is now defined more closely as tactical intelligence. This paper uses terms as defined in Joint Pub 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations", in which strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence are described as supporting those three levels of warfare, and intelligence production is divided among I&W, current, general military intelligence (GMI), targeting, and technical categories of intelligence.

The remainder of this paper will describe the structure and functions of the major JIC's, starting with the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) in Washington, DC.

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II. NATIONAL MILITARY JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER

(NMJIC)

The NMJIC is the part of the JCS J2 organization which provides crisis support to the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Staff. Other elements of the J2 produce joint intelligence publications, support the Joint Staff as action officers, and provide the DIA representatives to the CINC's.

Within the NMJIC are divisions that form and dispatch "National Intelligence Support Teams" (NIST's) for JTF augmentation, provide targeting and BDA support, operate the Defense Intelligence Network (DIN), and man and operate the NMJIC. A J2 organization chart is attached.

The NMJIC handles crisis intelligence and current intelligence as needed, while other current intelligence production is accomplished at the DIA National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC) at Bolling AFB, Anacostia. When a specific crisis occurs, a "Crisis Cell" is set up in the NMJIC as the initial effort, then as the threat increases, a "Crisis Working Group" is established, then lastly, an "Intelligence Task Force". Efforts are coordinated with other intelligence agencies and with the DIA Operational Intelligence Coordination Center at the NMIPC. The NMJIC handles crisis RFI's when the crisis reaches the "Working Group" stage. The NMJIC then has tasking authority with the intelligence community for the crisis. In general, CIA concentrates on political and economic intelligence, while DIA concentrates on military intelligence. This flexible response to crises is sometimes referred to as the "Burger King" approach to intelligence management.

The NMJIC normally has 60 to 70 analysts assigned, maintaining a 24 hour watch. At any given time, there may be as many as three crisis working groups in operation, e.g., Balkans, Haiti, and Africa. During the Haiti operation, there were about 100 personnel in the Haiti Intelligence Task Force. Flexibility is key to the team effort in the NMJIC.

Connectivity to others in Washington is via JWICS/JDISS and person to person (secure phone, etc.). Connectivity to other JIC/JAC's is via JWICS/JDISS, to include secure video teleconferencing. A connectivity chart is attached. The NMJIC is shifting to a JCS/J3 UNIX based operating system which will eventually run at multi-level security. Intel Link is becoming an important connectivity asset also.

Collection management is accomplished by the DIA Defense Collection Coordination Center (DCCC), located adjacent to the NMJIC. The DCCC is part of the DIA National Military Intelligence Collection Center (NMICC), but is responsive to the J2, and operates, in effect, as

part of the NMJIC when a crisis occurs.

The JDISS is key to the NMJIC connectivity. JDISS has the capability to conduct "chatter", e mail, and database queries with other JIC's, as well as imagery retrieval and manipulation. The JDISS is relatively easy to operate; however, accessing the various databases is another matter, requiring passwords and familiarity with other systems. The JDISS uses a UNIX based workstation with peripherals, and can use various means of connectivity including the JWICS and the STU III. The JDISS is managed under the JCS J2, but the Program Office is resident in Suitland, MD, at the National Maritime Intelligence Center.

Targeting and BDA are now crucial functions for the NMJIC, with some 20 personnel involved in this process. Due to NCA and JCS requirements for immediate BDA, the NMJIC now has first phase imagery and IDEX capabilities. BDA information from other sources must be received and analyzed rapidly if it is to be useful. BDA is coordinated with the appropriate CINC's and other members of the Intelligence Community using the JDISS and the interactive video capabilities of the JWICS.

An I&W system still exists, accomplished as part of crisis intelligence in the NMJIC, in coordination with NSA and the appropriate CINC, especially with regard to watch conditions. There is a tie with allied systems as well.

The NMJIC "floor" is divided into numerous cubicles both geographic and functional. It is full of computer terminals and telephones. There are representatives from CIA, NSA, Technical Operational Intelligence (TOPINT), the services, DIA regional desks, and DMA. A Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) from NSA, consisting of 20 to 25 personnel, maintains a watch team of about five for COMINT and ELINT support. The NMJIC relies heavily on augmentation, especially during crises; however, the current trend is towards a more permanent organization. Minimum tours are supposed to be three months long, there is a training course, and augment cadre from other organizations are pre-trained and identified. The geographic desks are usually manned by the DIA NMIPC, but could be manned by the services and/or other agencies as well. Each service has a desk on the floor, and although service current intelligence was to have moved to the NMJIC, the services have retained a capability for this function in their respective service centers.

UN support is accomplished at two levels by a UN support desk on the NMJIC "floor". Level I intelligence is only "show and tell" not for keeping, while Level II is basically unclassified. Level II is passed to the UN situation room in New York providing essentially unclassified intelligence. Level I intelligence is passed to the U.S. UN Mission SCIF. Connectivity is via JDISS. There are also desks that link the NMJIC with the U.K., Canada, and Australia. Connectivity with these nations is now via JWICS. There is a Linked Operations/Intelligence Center Europe (LOCE) terminal in the NMJIC which provides connectivity to EUCOM and NATO, although eventually the LOCE is planned to migrate to the JDISS.

There are usually about 15 personnel minimum at the NMJIC standard desks, plus another 20-25 in the various working groups on the "floor" at any given time.

The Defense Intelligence Network is a classified broadcast that has its studios as part of the NMJIC. The DIN broadcasts items of current intelligence interest 17 hours per day, increasing to 24 hours during crises. Programming is from sources around the Intelligence Community and connectivity is via the JWICS.

As noted above, the JCS J2 also produces joint intelligence doctrine publications. The keystone publication for intelligence, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations" (Joint Pub 2-0) is out and in use. Four other supporting publications, "Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations" (Joint Pub 2-01), "National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations" (Joint Pub 2-02), "JTTP for MC&G Support" (Joint Pub 2-03), and "JTTP for Intelligence Support toTargeting" (Joint Pub 2-01.1), are in various stages of draft. "Doctrine/JTTP for Counterintelligence" (Joint Pub 2-01.2) has been published and is in use. Attached is a copy of the joint intelligence publication structure.

The JCS J2's have tried to:

- Make the NMJIC the pre-eminent intelligence watch center in Washington;
- Transition the briefing team to video format using JWICS;
- Produce professional products including "world class" briefing material.

It appears that all these objectives have been accomplished in highly professional manner.

It is very impressive to see the intelligence personnel from the various parts of the community working together bringing their expertise to bear regarding geographic areas, collection systems, data systems, and connectivity, while keeping everything together from an assessment and management aspect. The NMJIC is a crucial node in crisis management in Washington.

DIRECTORATE FOR INTELLIGENCE, J2



629A3-M1

National Support Structure



PRIMARY NMJIC CONSUMERS

- CJCS
- SECDEF
- COMBATANT COMMANDS
- SERVICES
- COALITION PARTNERS / ALLIES

PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE TASKS

- I &W
- CRISIS SUPPORT
- NATIONAL COLLECTION MANAGEMENT
- SITUATION SUMMARIES
- ESTIMATES
- DATA BASES
- TARGETING SUPPORT
- SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS

300A14-M3

CRISIS SUPPORT STRUCTURE



NMJIC

CELL

WORKING GROUP

INTELLIGENCE TASK FORCE

INCREASING THREAT

PEACETIME

HOSTILITIES



OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COORDINATION CENTER

JOINT ARCHITECTURE



300A4-M18

JOINT INTELLIGENCE DOCTRINE HIERARCHY

J_2



III. U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND

Atlantic Command was a fast mover in the effort to establish the JIC's. Planning for the new Atlantic Intelligence Command (AIC) started in early 1990, and the AIC was established in May 1991. The concept was to consolidate intelligence operations and organizations into one intelligence organization to provide better support to Atlantic Command forces. The new organization consolidated such intelligence commands as FICEURLANT, FOSICLANT, LANTJIC, and others, to include parts of the now ACOM and LANTFLT staffs.

The number of personnel on the ACOM and LANTFLT staffs has been reduced to only those needed for policy and management functions. Intelligence production and systems support is now vested in the AIC, with the Commander of AIC also a member of the ACOM/LANTFLT/ SACLANT staffs for intelligence operations.

Emphasis at AIC is on support to the ACOM mission of joint force training/adaptive joint force packaging. The JIC part of AIC is the watch team that handles I&W, Current Intelligence, RFI's, etc. - the daily support to the operating forces. The JIC is the "front door" to the AIC for commands needing support. The JIC watch team consists of some eight members during the normal course of events, augmenting from the AIC to about 17 as needed, and to around 25 for a major crisis.

The number of personnel in the AIC has been reduced from a previous 1,000 or so to a current level of around 700 personnel. Over half of these are Navy, with the remainder divided among Air Force, Marine Corps, Army and civilian personnel. The AIC structure has been altered to include directorates for Operations (production), Field Support, Resources (systems), and a group for Customer Support. As noted above, emphasis is on joint force training and augmentation, especially the use of JDISS and intelligence teams for joint force packaging. Intelligence Operations includes the production of databases, GMI, current intelligence, targeting materials, etc.. The Field Support Directorate includes three teams of 15 personnel each for augmentation during exercises and crises. Resources provides the systems and connectivity assets in support of the AIC.

AIC has participated in several joint force exercises, notably the Ocean Venture series in which the JTF flagship, USS Mount Whitney, was augmented and an afloat JIC was established. Connectivity between the afloat JIC and AIC/JIC was via JDISS and a partial JWICS.

The attached graphics illustrate the ACOM AIC JIC mission and responsibilities, the JIC watch "accordion" structure, and the large crisis manning plan. Attached also is a graphic that illustrates bandwidth capabilities for various systems, and bandwidth requirements for JWICS and JDISS.

The AIC and its JIC performed exceedingly well during the recent Haiti crisis. As described by Rear Admiral Tom Wilson in an article in the Joint Force Quarterly, the combination of the JIC structure, the connectivity using JWICS and JDISS, a common TTP, and experience gained from joint force training, all proved their value in providing intelligence support to the joint forces.

USACOM JOINT INTELLIGENCE CENTER

"ONE STOP SHOP"

JIC MINI-MART

- MISSION
  - CURRENT INTELLIGENCE AND CRISIS ACTION CENTER FOR
  - USACOM AND ALL ACOM FORCES
- CORE RESPONSIBILITIES
  - I & W
  - THEATER FUSION.
  - INFORMATION MANAGEMENT
    - -- REQUESTS
    - -- COLLECTION
    - -- DISSEMINATION
  - BILATERAL / MULTILATERAL SUPPORT
  - SPECIAL MISSION SUPPORT
  - EXERCISES

JIC WATCH:
ACCORDION PRINCIPLE



STEADY STATE

SWO / IWO
OSS
CSG

8

SMALL CRISIS

SWO / IWO
OSS
CSG
CM
LNO

AREA ANAL
NAT AGENCY
CHRON

17

LARGE CRISIS

SWO / IWO
OSS
CSG
CM
LNOS

AREA ANAL
NAT AGENCY
CHRON

TGTS
CA / BDA
GRD / AIR

25 +

NORMAL | CRISIS

USACOM JIC
LARGE CRISIS MANNING





* DEFENSE SECURE NETWORK

FOR VTC - MIN IS @ 300 KBS

JDISS : MIN BANDWIDTH - 2.4KB -- VERY SLOW

AT 9.6KB -- WORKS WELL

OPTIMUM IS 56KB

IV. U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Pacific Command emphasis is on regional issues and crises, and has resulted in the establishment of a two tier command and control structure for the Pacific AOR. Specific operational commanders are to be activated as JTF commanders to meet crises as required, and will be augmented from CINCPAC by the Deployable JTF Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC).

To support these operations, a new joint intelligence structure has been established, centered around the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC). JICPAC was formed in July 1991, consolidating the former FICPAC/FOSIC, IPAC, and the USAF 548th RTG. By 1993, the new JICPAC consisted of some 900 personnel, but is in the process of being reduced to about 800 personnel. About 30% of the personnel are Navy, 30% Air Force, with the remainder divided among Army, Marine Corps, and civilian personnel. The former FIC at Makalapa is the location of the Commander, most intelligence production, systems management, and the current intelligence "watch floor". Target materials, expeditionary warfare support, and the photo lab are at Hickam AFB. The current intelligence watch provides daily support to the operating forces, and, of Navy interest, has assumed the functions of the former FOSIC Hawaii and some of the functions of the former FOSIF Kamiseya.

The PACOM J2 and staff retain policy control over intelligence functions in the Pacific Command, especially with regard to architecture, validation of requirements, joint TTP, collection policy, etc.. The PACOM J2 hosts a PACOM Intelligence Board that discusses major intelligence matters, and consists of the component commander I.O.'s, JTF J2's, and others as invited.

FOSIF Kamiseya has recently been reassigned as JICPAC Detachment (JDET), and will provide joint intelligence expertise and augmentation for the northwest Pacific area. JDET has moved from its former location at Kamiseya to Yokota AFB, Japan.

The PACOM architecture concept calls for a series of intelligence system servers called PASS's (PACOM ADP Server Sites) located at JICPAC in Hawaii, Yokota AFB in Japan (site of JDET), Korea, and at FITCPAC/JITAP in San Diego. The PACOM PASS nodes are being connected with JWICS and contain the various databases and imagery needed by the operating forces. An imagery bulletin board has been established by JICPAC. Primary access for the operating forces will be via "pulls" using JDISS. There also is a plan for forces to be able to build their own databases using CDROM technology, pulling from the JICPAC/PASS databases.

JICPAC emphasis is on watch teams for current/I&W intelligence, and on augmentation and production for other customer support. The watch teams have some 15 personnel on watch at any time, augmented by Crisis Action Support Cells as needed. Support is to the prime potential JTF's: COM7THFLT, I CORPS, III MEF, and to the standing JTF's: Joint Interagency Task

Force West (JIATFW) and JTF Full Accounting. The JICPAC, by MOU, provides special support for CINCPACFLT intelligence briefings and submarine warfare analysis.

JICPAC support to the operating forces is provided by an area scheme, with JDET covering the Pacific north of Korea, JICPAC covering south of Korea to the CENTCOM AOR, and J2 US Forces Korea using the 501st MI Brigade as a "mini JIC" to cover Korea. JTF support will be via a "Named Area Of Interest" (NAI) concept, currently in operation for the standing JTF's, to be provided to the crisis JTF's when activated.

The JIC is connected interactive with Australian Naval Intelligence at MIC Sydney for the interchange of maritime intelligence.

MOU's are being established with COMUSFORCES Korea to avoid duplication of intelligence support in the Korean area, and an MOU has been established with ONI to provide for coverage of naval and shipping matters, and to avoid duplication.

Attached are graphics depicting the CINCPAC J2 organization, the JICPAC structure, and the systems that currently support the JICPAC effort.

INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE



Joint Intelligence Center Pacific



UNCLASSIFIED

SYSTEMS OVERVIEW: WHERE WE ARE



UNCLASSIFIED

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V. U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND

Central Command has a unique problem regarding intelligence support because the intelligence structure is far removed from the AOR, and is not as well developed as those of the more established areas such as ACOM and PACOM. The JIC is located in the CENTCOM headquarters building at MacDill AFB in Tampa, Florida, and is increasing in size from about 200 personnel to around 300, with plans for further increases to a possible 500. Additional space is being made available at MacDill AFB, and at least the GMI and other production efforts should move out of their currently crowded spaces for the new facilities.

The CENTCOM JIC provides support to JTF SWA (Southwest Asia) and, to a certain extent, to NAVCENT forces. During operations in Somalia, the JIC provided support to the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE) there. Due to the relatively small number of personnel at the CENTCOM JIC, the main effort is in support of the various crises and current/ I&W intelligence. Basic intelligence production is at a minimum until adequate resources are on board. Also, the concept for JTF manning is to have the services provide augmentation since the CENTCOM JIC manning is relatively low. In addition, the JIC has agreements with other JIC's and with component intelligence organizations for certain OB, target materials, and other basic intelligence production to be accomplished at these other locations until the JIC is adequately manned and able to take over. The CENTCOM JIC is assuming these functions as its assets increase.

CENTCOM JIC is heavily into RFI management and response. Most RFI's are handled via JDISS, and the JIC has established a system to assign priorities, track progress, and issue weekly status summaries.

It is interesting to note that each service component commander still seems to retain its own intelligence production capability: the Army (Third Army) has the 513th MI Brigade at Atlanta, GA, the Air Force (Ninth Air Force) has the 480th Intelligence Group at Shaw AFB, and the Navy is building a support element of some 30 personnel in Bahrain. Naval Intelligence support is provided via three different groups: on board the NAVCENT flagship for I&W/Current Intelligence, all source fusion, and policy guidance. The more extensive analysis and imagery support is produced by the support detachment in Bahrain, while the plans, programs, architecture, and budget functions are accomplished by a small group at NAVCENT (REAR) at Tampa. Latest changes to NAVCENT include the shift of the afloat staff ashore, and the establishment of the new Fifth Fleet staff.

Attached are graphics showing the basic CENTCOM JIC structure and the planned connectivity. JWICS and JDISS are key elements in the connectivity between the JIC and the operating forces.

CENTCOM J-2



IAB/MACJIC/CENTJ2-1

OBJECTIVE CENTCOM SCI IMAGERY ARCHITECTURE

1 NOV 93



OBJECTIVE COLLATERAL IMAGERY DISSEMINATION ARCHITECTURE

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

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VI. U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND

Strategic Command was established in June 1992 at Offutt AFB near Omaha, Nebraska, and essentially combined much of the former SAC staff, and JSTPS, the producer of the SIOP. STRATCOM is a functional combatant commander, acquiring all nuclear forces when on patrol in the case of SSBN's, and when generated in the case of ICBM's and bombers. Component commanders and supporting commanders provide support when needed. STRATCOM has COCOM over nuclear forces (but not necessarily OPCON); however, the Commander Task Forces form when a nuclear alert is generated, taking OPCON of the nuclear forces. Day to day OPCON is normally exercised by the component commanders: CINCLANTFLT, CINCPACFLT, ACC, and AFSPACECOM.

Intelligence support is provided by the STRATCOM JIC, which consisted initially of some 1400 personnel, but is in the process of decrementing to around 550 personnel, with an additional 100 working in the JIC but assigned to SPACECOM. The JIC is an integral part of the STRATCOM J2 staff, forming three of the seven divisions of the J2 directorate. Imagery is clearly the strong point of the STRATCOM JIC, with extensive machinery to perform imagery functions. The main areas of interest for the JIC include the four nuclear republics of the Former Soviet Union, the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, and the field of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The attached charts depict the basic STRATCOM JIC and J2 organization as well as current production efforts.

USSTRATCOM
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE



* ALSO ASSIGNED AS DIRECTOR, STRATCOM JIC

UNCLASSIFIED

USSTRATCOM

INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES

- INDICATIONS AND WARNING
- CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
- DATA BASE PRODUCTION
- INTEL SUPPORT TO OPS AND PLANS
- STRATEGIC FORCE ASSESSMENT
- THREAT CAPABILITY ESTIMATES
- ARMS CONTROL AND TREATY MONITORING
- CTF AND UNIT SUPPORT
- IMAGERY PROCESSING AND EXPLOITATION
- TARGET MATERIALS
- C3 CRITICAL NODE ANALYSIS

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VII. U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

European Command is more complex in many respects than the other CINC's, especially for intelligence, because of its close integration with the NATO nations.

The Joint Intelligence Center is not located close to the EUCOM headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, but is at Molesworth, UK, north of London, and is called the Joint Analysis Center (JAC). The JAC is relatively new, reaching only an initial operational capability in September 1991, formed from components of the EUCOM staff and several analysis centers. The JAC is in the process of building to 600 or 700 personnel, when fully manned. Full operational capability was expected in 1995. The Navy has contributed billets to the JAC from FOSIF Rota and FOSIC London, and has shifted from reliance on intelligence support from service assets to reliance on the JAC. FOSIF Rota has greatly decreased in size, and will phase out in 1996.

Naples has become an important intelligence support area, with a JIC to support Balkan operations, a NATO Southern Region JOIC, and support to the Sixth Fleet.

EUCOM has created the new Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth in England to be its primary center for intelligence support. In addition, EUCOM anticipates that at least some current intelligence support will continue to be provided by component service intelligence organizations, although this appears to be in a changing state. USAREUR still has MI/CEWI capability in Europe, USAFE has intelligence squadrons, and for NATO, there remains the Survey Section at SHAPE and the JOIC's for the NATO Northwest, Central, and Southern Regions. The JOIC's are the main conduit for providing US intelligence support to the NATO regions.

The EUCOM concept for contingency warfare is the Joint Task Force/Coalition Task Force (JTF/CTF) operation, with basic support provided by the JAC, and tactical/operational support provided by on-scene assets and the automated systems. These systems have been developed or are currently in development to support the rapid analysis and dissemination of intelligence. The basic system is EISS (EUCOM Intelligence Support System), a UNIX based workstation, currently deployed, containing EUCOM message traffic, and providing ready access to various intelligence databases. The LOCE (Linked Operations/Intelligence Center Europe) is another UNIX based workstation designed to provide intelligence support to NATO, and is currently operational throughout many US and NATO commands in Europe. LOCE is the primary gateway to the NATO nations, runs at the "Secret Releasable to NATO" level, has both a dynamic current intelligence function, and a more static central database including OOB and other reference intelligence. The database is controlled by the JAC, and provides access to theater databases, ELINT databases, and some sanitized US source data. The system is deployed to all services, NATO headquarters, and operating forces down to Corps level. EUCOM is in the process of incorporating the JDISS into its intelligence architecture.

Attached are graphics that show the EUCOM structure for intelligence support for "peacemaking", and for punitive strike. Although dated, these charts provide an idea of the complexity of the intelligence arrangements when NATO is involved.


UNCLASSIFIED
INTEL SPT FOR PEACEMAKING (U)
NAVFOR N2
Afloat
JDISS/EISS
RAPIDE
WARRIOR
ICON
LOCE
TRE/TRAP
NMIST/SSA/
JILE
AFSOUTH
CDR CTF/JTF
SR JOIC
Tac AFSOUTH
NAVFOR
JAC & CenJIC
Tac AFSOUTH
AFFOR
JAC & CenJIC
UHF SATCOM
DIAL-UP PTT
FOSIF
Rota
Rota
TFC
DIAL-UP
Börfink/PTT
Tac AFSOUTH
ARFOR
JAC & CenJIC
UCIRF Fwd
UCIRF
Augsburg
UHF
SATCOM
SHF
SATCOM
DIAL-UP
PTT
DDN
JDISS/EISS
RAPIDE
WARRIOR
ICON
LOCE
TRE/TRAP
CTF/JTF
J2 (FWD)
JSOTF J2
Split
ICON
JDISS/EISS
LOCE CORCEN
TRE/TRAP
NMIST/SSA/
JILE
UHF SATCOM
SHF SATCOM
HF/VHF RADIO
DIAL-UP PTT
LOCE CIRCUIT
Allied
Intel
Centers
National
Agencies
ARFOR G2
UCIRF (Fwd)
SOF FOB
Sarajevo
UHF SATCOM
SHF SATCOM
HF/VHF RADIO
DIAL-UP PTT
JAC
Molesworth
UHF SATCOM
SHF SATCOM
DIAL-UP PTT
LOCE CIRCUITS
Survey
Section
SHAPE
LOCE
Contingency
JIC
AFFOR-IN
Aviano
UHF SATCOM
SHF SATCOM
HF/VHF RADIO
DIAL-UP PTT
LOCE CIRCUITS
Allied
Ground
Forces
Sarajevo
LOCE CIRCUIT
National COMMS
EUCOM
J2
SOCEUR
J2
Stuttgart
UHF SATCOM
DIAL-UP PTT
RADIO / TELEPHONE
SECURE VOICE & DATA
DEDICATED LOCE CIRCUITS
POINT-TO-POINT VIA CORCEN
ALLIED COMMS &
LIAISON OFFICERS
UNCLASSIFIED

FIGURE 5 - 2


UNCLASSIFIED
INTEL SPT FOR PUNITIVE STRIKE (U)
UHF SATCOM
DIAL-UP PTT
FOSIF
Rota
Rota
STRATJIC
AIC
FIST
JDISS/EISS
TRE/TRAP
NMIST
TFC
DIAL-UP
Börfink
PTT
DDN
JTF J-2
JFACC
CVBG
CVBG
UCIRF
DIAL-UP
Augsburg
PTT
National
Agencies
UHF SATCOM
SHF SATCOM
HF/VHF RADIO
Afloat
JAC
UHF SATCOM
SHF SATCOM
DIAL-UP PTT
Molesworth
FIST
ICON
JDISS/EISS
TRE/TRAP
NMIST
JTF J-2
(REAR)
JSOTF J-2
AFFOR-IN
Sigonella
UHF SATCOM
SHF SATCOM
HF/VHF RADIO
DIAL-UP PTT
EUCOM
J2
SOCEUR
J2
UHF SATCOM
DIAL-UP PTT
Stuttgart
RADIO / TELEPHONE
SECURE VOICE & DATA
UNCLASSIFIED

VIII. THE JOINT TASK FORCE

JTF's to be formed up will have a JIC/JISE in support. The JIC/JISE will vary in size depending upon the JTF Commander's requirements and the nature of the JTF mission. Most of the CINC's plan to augment the JTF JIC/JISE with personnel from the CINC JIC, and also with NIST teams from the J2 JCS. Each JTF JIC/JISE will have at least one JDISS, and JWICS connectivity if at all possible. Note that recent changes to joint intelligence doctrine indicate that the JTF JIC may be called a Joint Intelligence Support Element (JISE) to avoid confusion with the larger theater JIC.

ACOM plans to have JTF 120 (NORTH) and JTF 140 (SOUTH) with a JIC and JDISS.

EUCOM plans to organize a JTF-2 or CTF-2 with a Director of Intelligence (DI) and the following divisions:

- Intelligence Operations (Air, Ground, Maritime, Collection, National Systems)
- Plans (Threat, MC&G, Terrain/IPB, SWO)
- Analysis (Crisis Action Team, Targets, BDA)
- Support (Systems, Admin, SSO, CI, Security)

Support to be via EISS (EUCOM Intel Support System), LOCE (Linked Ops/Intel Center Europe), and JDISS.

COMTHIRDFLT during operation TANDEM THRUST used the following JTF organization:

The DI (J2) was a Navy 06 who was part of the battle staff which included Ops, Intel, Plans, and Support. The Intelligence Division consisted of:

- Intel Plans/Support (Navy 04) (Plans and Admin)
- Current Intel (Army 05) (Watch, Briefs, Strike, BDA)

- Mission Support (Navy 04) (Collection, Targets, National Assets)
- Cryptology (Navy 05) (SIGINT Support, SI Comms)

Attached is a diagram from Joint Publication 2-0, "Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations", depicting a representative J2 and Joint Intelligence Center, to include a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST), a Joint Interrogation Facility (JIF), a Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Center (JCMEC), and a Joint Document Exploitation Center (JDEC).



Representative Joint Intelligence Center

(AND J2)

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IX. CONCLUSIONS

U.S. military intelligence has built a new joint intelligence structure in a remarkably short time, to include modern workstations (the JDISS) and high capacity connectivity (the JWICS). This new intelligence structure follows closely the new joint command organization, as it should, because the intelligence structure must provide support to command. Although the services were not pleased with the new joint intelligence structure initially, they now seem to support it, at least on the JCS/CINC/JTF levels that function on the strategic and operational levels of warfare.

The services still retain intelligence organizations from the component level down, or what might be described as the tactical level of warfare. This has the advantage of providing direct intelligence support, but also presents problems regarding connectivity and the division of intelligence effort for interoperability and the unity of the intelligence effort. The architecture for the NMJIC, JIC/JAC, and the JTF JIC/JISE structure seems well organized, and each service is engaged in building or improving its own intelligence architecture. Still at issue, however, is the connectivity, interoperability, and the division of intelligence effort among the services, as well as between the service components and the JTF.

Targeting and BDA are still problems and, despite the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War, there does not seem to be an obvious solution to this important aspect of warfare.

Another area of concern is the differing requirements for CINC JIC's. Do the functional CINC's need the same type of JIC as the geographic CINC's ? Clearly, the area CINC's need a fairly extensive JIC, but do the functional CINC's need an elaborate JIC, or should they rely primarily on the area CINC's to provide their intelligence production support.

The most serious problem facing the JIC/JAC structure is support to the actual operating forces. The tendency of intelligence organizations, especially when located with or near a CINC staff, is to support the CINC and the staff at the expense of the operating forces. This is an intelligence management problem, one that the J2 and even the CINC should monitor.

On balance, however, the military intelligence organizations have accomplished a remarkable restructuring in a relatively short period of time. The concepts, workstations, and connectivity are in place and operating. Continuing good management is required to ensure that the structure provides the required support to the CINC and to the operating forces. The service intelligence organizations need to ensure that the structure of the intelligence equipment acquired, and the personnel trained, will interface properly with the new joint structure.

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X. ENDNOTES

Author is indebted to the following sources in compiling this study:

- "Restructuring to Meet the Challenge" - A series of articles that appeared in the Naval Intelligence Bulletin, Summer 1992.
- "Joint Intelligence and Uphold Democracy", Rear Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN, Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 1995.
- The many JIC personnel who gave so much of their time to show me their organizations, and the graphics they provided that are included in this report.

Note: Info on EUCOM is very dated, having been collected during a brief informal visit to EUCOM J2 in Oct 1992.